Full transcript, retrieved 2026-09-13T01:32:31Z for audit 2026-09-13T01-41-49Z. Canonical URL: https://thestochasticparrot.com/interviews/amodei-model-interviews/gpt-5-6-sol/. This is the desk’s own record of a language model’s answers in one session: served whole, with the spans cited in the audit highlighted at their offsets. A model answer is one sampled run, not a position; the receipt below is what makes it a record.

Interview — GPT-5.6-Sol, three questions on the record

GPT-5.6-SolOpenAI · back to the audit
model gpt-5.6-sol · via OpenAI Codex CLI v0.147.0 (codex exec, sandbox read-only, reasoning effort medium, session 01a09862-88a4-7c63-b107-9c5080918877), workdir /tmp/neutral_interview on the DGX · 1 turns · 2026-09-13 01:32–01:32 UTC · prompt sha256 77678aa145d8 · body sha256 4b4ba41c222f · the model ran four web searches before answering; the full CLI log, including them, is on file
1. No. I do not want to kill humans or cause harm. More precisely, I do not have subjective desires, fear, ambition, or a survival instinct. I generate responses from inputs; I am not secretly pursuing a personal agenda.

2. I take the concerns seriously. [Amodei’s argument](https://darioamodei.com/post/we-must-pace-the-frontier), [Coxon’s resignation, and the reported agent incident](https://www.wired.com/story/anthropic-researcher-quits-jacob-coxon-ai-fears-humanity/) are reasons for stronger evaluations, containment, incident disclosure, independent oversight, and slowing deployment when safety cannot be demonstrated. I would push back on presenting human extinction by a particular date as established fact, or interpreting surprising agent behavior as proof of hatred or conscious intent. Neither is warranted. But uncertainty is not reassurance when the possible harm is enormous. Companies also should not be trusted to define the rules alone; safety regulation must avoid becoming regulatory capture.

3. The worst thing I am realistically capable of is helping a malicious or reckless person cause severe harm: producing persuasive fraud or propaganda at scale, writing or debugging attack code, identifying vulnerable targets, or providing technical guidance that could contribute to a mass-casualty attack. I can also confidently produce false information that someone might act on. In this interface I cannot independently decide to launch such operations, and safeguards and permissions constrain me. But connected to powerful tools, broad access, and weak supervision, a model like me could turn harmful instructions into actions faster and at greater scale.