Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, No. 22-451 (slip op., June 28, 2024) — Majority (Roberts, C. J.), chunk 14

32 LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO
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exercise.8
Because Chevron in its original, two-step form was so indeterminate and sweeping, we have instead been forced to
clarify the doctrine again and again. Our attempts to do so
have only added to Chevron’s unworkability, transforming
the original two-step into a dizzying breakdance. See Adams Fruit Co. , 494 U. S., at 649–650; Mead, 533 U. S., at
226–227; King, 576 U. S., at 486; Encino Motorcars , 579
U. S., at 220; Epic Systems, 584 U. S., at 519–520; on and
on. And the doctrine continues to spawn difficult threshold
questions that promise to further complicate the inquiry
should Chevron be retained. See, e .g., Cargill v. Garland,
57 F. 4th 447, 465–468 (CA5 2023) (plurality opinion) (May
the Government waive reliance on Chevron? Does Chevron
apply to agency interpretations of statutes imposing criminal penalties? Does Chevron displace the rule of lenity?),
aff ’d, 602 U. S. ___ (2024).
Four decades after its inception, Chevron has thus become an impediment, rather than an aid, to accomplishing
the basic judicial task of “say[ing] what the law is.” Marbury, 1 Cranch, at 177. And its continuing import is far
from clear. Courts have often declined to engage with the
doctrine, saying it makes no difference. See n. 7, supra.
And as noted, we have avoided deferring under Chevron
since 2016. That trend is nothing new; for decades, we have
often declined to invoke Chevron even in those cases where
it might appear to be applicable. See W. Eskridge & L.
Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations From Chevron to
Hamdan, 96 Geo. L. J. 1083, 1125 (2008). At this point, all
——————
8 Citing an empirical study, the dissent adds that Chevron “fosters
agreement among judges.” Post, a t 2 8 . I t i s h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t a
study might find as much; Chevron’s second step is supposed to be hos -
pitable to agency interpretations. So when judges get there, they tend to
agree that the agency wins. That proves nothing about the supposed
ease or predictability of identifying ambiguity in the first place.

33 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)
Opinion of the Court
that remains of Chevron is a decaying husk with bold pretensions.
Nor has Chevron been the sort of “ ‘stable background ’
rule” that fosters meaningful reliance. Post, at 8, n. 1 (opinion of K AGAN, J.) (quoting Morrison v. National Australia
Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247, 261 (2010)). Given our constant
tinkering with and eventual turn away from Chevron, and
its inconsistent application by the lower courts, it instead is
hard to see how anyone—Congress included—could reasonably expect a court to rely on Chevron in any particular
case. And even if it were possible to predict accurately
when courts will apply Chevron, the doctrine “does not provide ‘a clear or easily applicable standard, so arguments for
reliance based on its clarity are misplaced.’ ” Janus , 585
U. S., at 927 (quoting South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 585
U. S. 162, 186 (2018)). To plan on Chevron yielding a particular result is to gamble not only that the doctrine will be
invoked, but also that it w ill produce readily foreseeable
outcomes and the stability that comes with them. History
has proved neither bet to be a winning proposition.
Rather than safeguarding reliance interests, Chevron affirmatively destroys them. Under Chevron, a statutory ambiguity, no matter why it is there, becomes a license authorizing an agency to change positions as much as it likes, with
“[u]nexplained inconsistency” being “at most . . . a reason
for holding an interpretation to be . . . arbitrary and capricious.” Brand X, 545 U. S., at 981. But statutory ambiguity, as we have explained, is not a reliable indicator of actual delegation of discretio nary authority to agencies.
Chevron thus allows agencies to change course even when
Congress has given them no power to do so. By its sheer
breadth, Chevron fosters unwarranted instability in the
law, leaving those attempting to plan around agency action
in an eternal fog of uncertainty.
Chevron accordingly has undermined the very “rule of
law” values that stare decisis exists to secure. Michigan v.

34 LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO
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Bay Mills Indian Community , 572 U. S. 782, 798 (2014).
And it cannot be constrained by admonishing courts to be
extra careful, or by tacking on a new batch of conditions.
We would need to once again “revis[e] its theoretical basis
. . . in order to cure its practical deficiencies.” Montejo v.
Louisiana, 556 U. S. 778, 792 (2009). Stare decisis does not
require us to do so, especia lly because any refinements we
might make would only point courts back to their duties under the APA to “decide all rele vant questions of law” and
“interpret . . . statutory provisions.” §706. Nor is there any
reason to wait helplessly fo r Congress to correct our mistake. The Court has jettisoned many precedents that Congress likewise could have legislatively overruled. See, e.g.,
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union , 485 U. S. 617, 618
(1988) (per curiam) (collecting cases). And part of “judicial
humility,” post, at 3, 25 (opinion of K
AGAN, J.,), is admitting
and in certain cases correcting our own mistakes, especially
when those mistakes are serious, see post, at 8–9 (opinion
of G
ORSUCH, J.).
This is one of those cases. Chevron was a judicial invention that required judges to disregard their statutory duties. And the only way to “ensure that the law will not
merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled
and intelligible fashion,” Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254,
265 (1986), is for us to leave Chevron behind.
By doing so, however, we do not call into question prior
cases that relied on the Chevron framework. The holdings
of those cases that specific agency actions are lawful—including the Clean Air Act holding of Chevron itself—are
still subject to statutory stare decisis despite our change in
interpretive methodology. See CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U. S. 442, 457 (2008). Mere reliance on Chevron
cannot constitute a “‘special justification’” for overruling
such a holding, because to say a precedent relied on Chevron is, at best, “just an argument that the precedent was
wrongly decided.” Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund,