Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, No. 22-451 (slip op., June 28, 2024) — Dissent (Kagan, J.), chunk 39

32 LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO
KAGAN, J., dissenting
Today, the majority does not respect that judgment. It
gives courts the power to make all manner of scientific and
technical judgments. It gives courts the power to make all
manner of policy calls, including about how to weigh com -
peting goods and values. (See Chevron itself.) It puts courts
at the apex of the administrative process as to every conceivable subject—because there are always gaps and ambiguities in regulatory statutes, and often of great import.
What actions can be taken to address climate change or
other environmental challenges? What will the Nation’s
health-care system look like in the coming decades? Or the
financial or transportation systems? What rules are going
to constrain the development of A.I.? In every sphere of
current or future federal regulation, expect courts from now
on to play a commanding role. It is not a role Congress has
given to them, in the APA or any other statute. It is a role
this Court has now claimed for itself, as well as for other
judges.
And that claim requires disrespecting, too, this Court’s
precedent. There are no special reasons, of the kind usually
invoked for overturning precedent, to eliminate Chevron
deference. And given Chevron’s pervasiveness, the decision
to do so is likely to produce large-scale disruption. All that
backs today’s decision is the majority’s belief that Chevron
was wrong—that it gave agencies too much power and
courts not enough. But shifting views about the worth of
regulatory actors and their work do not justify overhauling
a cornerstone of administrative law. In that sense too, today’s majority has lost sight of its proper role.
And it is impossible to pretend that today’s decision is a
one-off, in either its treatment of agencies or its treatment
of precedent. As to the first, this very Term presents yet
another example of the Court’s resolve to roll back agency
authority, despite congressional direction to the contrary.
See SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U. S. ___ (2024); see also supra, at
3. As to the second, just my own defenses of stare decisis—

33 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)
KAGAN, J., dissenting
my own dissents to this Court’s reversals of settled law—by
now fill a small volume. See Dobbs, 597 U. S., at 363–364
(joint opinion of Breyer, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.); Edwards v. Vannoy , 593 U. S. 255, 296–297 (2021); Knick v.
Township of Scott , 588 U. S. 180, 207–208 (2019); Janus ,
585 U. S., at 931–932. Once again, with respect, I dissent.