Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, No. 22-451 (slip op., June 28, 2024) — Syllabus, chunk 0

1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES ET AL. v. RAIMONDO,
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 22–451. Argued January 17, 2024—Decided June 28, 2024*
The Court granted certiorari in th ese cases limited to the question
whether Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U. S. 837, should be overru led or clarified. Under the Chevron doctrine, courts have sometimes been required to defer to “permissible” agency interpretations of th e statutes those agencies administer—even when a reviewing court reads the statute differently. Id., at
843. In each case below, the reviewing courts applied Chevron’s framework to resolve in favor of the Go vernment challenges by petitioners
to a rule promulgated by the Nati onal Marine Fisheries Service pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Act, 16 U. S. C. §1801 et seq., which
incorporates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. §551
et seq.
Held: The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their
independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within
its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency inter -
pretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous; Chevron is
overruled. Pp. 7–35.
(a) Article III of the Constitution assigns to the Federal Judiciary
the responsibility and power to ad judicate “Cases” and “Controversies”—concrete disputes with consequences for the parties involved.
The Framers appreciated that the laws judges would necessarily apply
in resolving those disputes would no t always be clear, but envisioned
——————
*Together with No. 22–1219, Relentless, Inc., et al. v. Department of
Commerce, et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit.

2 LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO
Syllabus
that the final “interpretation of the laws” would be “the proper and
peculiar province of the courts.” The Federalist No. 78, p. 525 (A. Hamilton). As Chief Justice Marshall declared in the foundational decision
of Marbury v. Madison, “[i]t is emphatically th e province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is.” 1 Cranch 137, 177. In
the decades following Marbury, when the meaning of a statute was at
issue, the judicial role was to “interpret the act of Congress, in order to
ascertain the rights of the parties.” Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497,
515.
The Court recognized from the outset, though, that exercising independent judgment often included according due respect to Executive
Branch interpretations of federal statutes. Such respect was thought
especially warranted when an Executive Branch interpretation was issued roughly contemporaneously wi th enactment of the statute and
remained consistent over time. The Court also gave “the most respectful consideration” to Executive Branch interpretations simply because
“[t]he officers concerned [were] usually able men, and masters of the
subject,” who may well have dr afted the laws at issue. United States
v. Moore, 95 U. S. 760, 763. “Respect,” though, was just that. The
views of the Executive Branch could inform the judgment of the Judiciary, but did not supersede it. “[I] n cases where [a court’s] own judgment . . . differ[ed] from that of other high functionaries,” the court was
“not at liberty to surrender, or to waive it.” United States v. Dickson,
15 Pet. 141, 162.
During the “rapid expansion of the administrative process” that took
place during the New Deal era, United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338
U. S. 632, 644, the Court often tr eated agency determinations of fact
as binding on the courts, provided that there was “evidence to support
the findings,” St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S.
38, 51. But the Court did not extend similar deference to agency resolutions of questions of law. “The interpretation of the meaning of statutes, as applied to justiciable cont roversies,” remained “exclusively a
judicial function.” United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc. ,
310 U. S. 534, 544. The Court also continued to note that the informed
judgment of the Executive Branch could be entitled to “great weight.”
Id., at 549. “The weight of such a judgment in a particular case,” the
Court observed, would “depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U. S. 134, 140.
Occasionally during this period , the Court applied deferential review after concluding that a particular statute empowered an agency
to decide how a broad statutory term applied to specific facts found by