Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, No. 22-451 (slip op., June 28, 2024) — Majority (Roberts, C. J.), chunk 5

5 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)
Opinion of the Court
the Administrative Procedure Ac t (APA), 5 U. S. C. §551
et seq. In relevant part, they argued that the MSA does not
authorize NMFS to mandate that they pay for observers required by a fishery management plan. The District Court
granted summary judgment to the Government. It concluded that the MSA authorized the Rule, but noted that
even if these petitioners’ “arguments were enough to raise
an ambiguity in the statutory text,” deference to the
agency’s interpretation would be warranted under Chevron.
544 F. Supp. 3d 82, 107 (DC 2021); see id., at 103–107.
A divided panel of the D. C. Circuit affirmed. See 45
F. 4th 359 (2022). The majority addressed various provisions of the MSA and concluded that it was not “wholly unambiguous” whether NMFS may require Atlantic herring
fishermen to pay for observers. Id., at 366. Because there
remained “some question” as to Congress’s intent, id., at
369, the court proceeded to Chevron’s second step and de -
ferred to the agency’s interpretation as a “reasonable” construction of the MSA, 45 F. 4th, at 370. In dissent, Judge
Walker concluded that Congress’s silence on industry
funded observers for the Atl antic herring fishery—coupled
with the express provision for such observers in other fisheries and on foreign vessels—unambiguously indicated that
NMFS lacked the authority to “require [Atlantic herring]
fishermen to pay the wages of at-sea monitors.” Id., at 375.
C
Petitioners Relentless Inc., Huntress Inc., and Seafreeze
Fleet LLC own two vessels that operate in the Atlantic herring fishery: the F/V Relentless and the F/V Persistence.
1
These vessels use small-mesh bottom-trawl gear and can
freeze fish at sea, so they can catch more species of fish and
take longer trips than other vessels (about 10 to 14 days, as
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1 For any landlubbers, “F/V” is simply the designation for a fishing vessel.

6 LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO
Opinion of the Court
opposed to the more typical 2 to 4). As a result, they generally declare into multiple fisheries per trip so they can catch
whatever the ocean offers up. If the vessels declare into the
Atlantic herring fishery for a particular trip, they must
carry an observer for that trip if NMFS selects the trip for
coverage, even if they end up harvesting fewer herring than
other vessels—or no herring at all.
This set of petitioners, like those in the D. C. Circuit case,
filed a suit challenging the Rule as unauthorized by the
MSA. The District Court, like th e D. C. Circuit, deferred to
NMFS’s contrary interpretation under Chevron and thus
granted summary judgment to the Government. See 561
F. Supp. 3d 226, 234–238 (RI 2021).
The First Circuit affirmed. See 62 F. 4th 621 (2023). It
relied on a “default norm” that regulated entities must bear
compliance costs, as well as the MSA’s sanctions provision,
Section 1858(g)(1)(D). See id., at 629–631. And it rejected
petitioners’ argument that the express statutory authorization of three industry funding programs demonstrated that
NMFS lacked the broad implicit authority it asserted to impose such a program for the Atlantic herring fishery. See
id., at 631–633. The court ultimately concluded that the
“[a]gency’s interpretation of its authority to require at-sea
monitors who are paid for by owners of regulated vessels
does not ‘exceed[ ] the bounds of the permissible.’ ” Id. , at
633–634 (quoting Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U. S. 212, 218
(2002); alteration in original). In reaching that conclusion,
the First Circuit stated that it was applying Chevron’s twostep framework. 62 F. 4th, at 628. But it did not explain
which aspects of its analysis were relevant to which of
Chevron’s two steps. Similarly, it declined to decide
whether the result was “a product of Chevron step one or
step two.” Id., at 634.
We granted certiorari in both cases, limited to the question whether Chevron should be overruled or clarified. See

7 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)
Opinion of the Court
601 U. S. ___ (2023); 598 U. S. ___ (2023).2
II
A
Article III of the Constitution assigns to the Federal Judiciary the responsibility and power to adjudicate “Cases”
and “Controversies”—concrete disputes with consequences
for the parties involved. The Framers appreciated that the
laws judges would necessarily apply in resolving those disputes would not always be clear. Cognizant of the limits of
human language and foresight, they anticipated that “[a]ll
new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill,
and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation,”
would be “more or less obscure and equivocal, until their
meaning” was settled “by a series of particular discussions
and adjudications.” The Federalist No. 37, p. 236 (J. Cooke
ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
The Framers also envisioned that the final “interpretation of the laws” would be “the proper and peculiar province
of the courts.” Id., No. 78, at 525 (A. Hamilton). Unlike the
political branches, the courts would by design exercise “neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment.” Id., at 523. To
ensure the “steady, upright and impartial administration of
the laws,” the Framers structured the Constitution to allow
judges to exercise that judgment independent of influence
from the political branches. Id., at 522; see id., at 522–524;
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U. S. 462, 484 (2011).
This Court embraced the Framers’ understanding of the
judicial function early on. In the foundational decision of
Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall famously de -
clared that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.” 1 Cranch 137,
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2 Both petitions also presented ques tions regarding the consistency of
the Rule with the MSA. See Pet. fo r Cert. in No. 22–451, p. i; Pet. for
Cert. in No. 22–1219, p. ii. We did not grant certiorari with respect to
those questions and thus do not reach them.